exec(unified): L2 foundation — contract §2 + whether-maker Router §6, pure, 26 tests

First code of the Unified Execution Layer (SPEC_UNIFIED_EXEC_LAYER_20260714.md). Pure
policy, stdlib+Decimal only, zero I/O, zero venue knowledge, zero importers elsewhere —
adopting it breaks nothing (freeze-safe; operator unparked the build 2026-07-14).

- contract.py: ExecutionRequest input surface (§2.1) + V-TYPES (Side, UrgencyClass,
  ProtectiveSpec, ExecutionAdvice), frozen, validated-at-construction, illegal states
  unrepresentable. 'an asset, a size, and a prayer'.
- router.py: decide(request) -> RoutingDecision — total pure map of the §6 urgency
  ladder. Encodes A1 adjudication verdict in the architecture: Router=whether-maker,
  SmartPlacer=where-in-book via the wants_placement/pre_submit seam. Complementary.
- _constants.py: policy magnitudes with provenance; PROVISIONAL ones flagged for
  L8/L10 calibration (never vibes, never a hardcoded cadence).
- test_exec_unified.py: 26 behaviour + mutation-litmus tests. Verified RED under
  CATASTROPHIC->MAKER and ACQUIRE cross_on_expiry->True mutations.

Not yet wired: PINK drive-loop port (§7), venue dialect (§11), telemetry (§12).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
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2026-07-14 23:00:42 +02:00
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"""Unified Execution Layer — the "T" of DITAv2 (spec SPEC_UNIFIED_EXEC_LAYER_20260714.md).
Standalone, pure-policy foundation. Contract (§2) + whether-maker Router (§6). Zero I/O,
zero venue knowledge, zero importers elsewhere yet — adopting it breaks nothing.
Not yet wired: the PINK drive-loop port (§7), the venue dialect (§11), telemetry (§12).
Those bolt on above/below this pure core. Kill switch discipline (UV_SMART_EXEC=0, §2.3
promise #5) lives at the wiring layer, not here.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from .contract import (
ExecutionAdvice,
ExecutionRequest,
ProtectiveSpec,
Side,
UrgencyClass,
)
from .router import ExecutionMethod, RoutingDecision, TtlDiscipline, decide
__all__ = [
"ExecutionAdvice",
"ExecutionMethod",
"ExecutionRequest",
"ProtectiveSpec",
"RoutingDecision",
"Side",
"TtlDiscipline",
"UrgencyClass",
"decide",
]

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"""Policy constants — from data, never vibes (spec §6 closing note).
Every constant cites its provenance. Where a number is not yet backed by an L8/L10
characterization row it is marked PROVISIONAL and must be calibrated before the smart
path arms with real capital — a provisional constant is a known-unknown, not a vibe.
Cadence is NEVER hardcoded here (no literal 1 s): the drive loop takes its clock
injected (spec §7, C1). These are policy magnitudes, not periods.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from decimal import Decimal
# PROTECT: "maker at touch, one reprice, ≤2 s total, then cross" (spec §6).
PROTECT_REPRICE_LIMIT: int = 1
PROTECT_MAX_MS: int = 2_000
# HARVEST: "maker at target ± offset, chase ≤ N; give up when regression eats X%
# of unrealized → cross" (spec §6). N and X are PROVISIONAL — no characterization
# row fixes them yet (§17 open question: chase bounds from bookDepth replay).
HARVEST_MAX_CHASES: int = 3 # PROVISIONAL — calibrate vs L8 fill_sim
HARVEST_GIVEUP_REGRESSION_FRAC: Decimal = Decimal("0.25") # PROVISIONAL — 25% of unrealized
# ACQUIRE: "patient maker inside spread; abandon, never chase" (spec §6, §4-1:
# a missed entry is free, a chased entry is not). No chase budget by construction.
ACQUIRE_MAX_CHASES: int = 0
# Dead-man's stop default multiple of software SL distance (spec §10, §17 open
# question: 2× vs ATR-scaled). PROVISIONAL default.
PROTECTIVE_STOP_MULT_DEFAULT: Decimal = Decimal("2.0")

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"""The Unified Execution Layer contract — "an asset, a size, and a prayer".
This is the WHOLE input surface (spec §2.1). Nothing about the caller's world may
leak in: not leverage math, not postures, not capital, not why-now. Every brain the
factory produces (BLUE, UV/BLUE-PRIME, VIOLET, VIBRASS children, MALKHUT) executes
through the same body by speaking only this vocabulary.
Pure stdlib + Decimal. Zero I/O, zero venue knowledge. V-TYPES discipline: frozen,
validated at construction, illegal states unrepresentable.
Provenance: prod/docs/SPEC_UNIFIED_EXEC_LAYER_20260714.md §2, §6.
Home-to-be: prod/clean_arch/dita_v2/exec/ (vendored). Lives standalone until the
vendor flow relocates it — do not import from the vendored dita_v2 tree yet.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from decimal import Decimal
from enum import Enum
class Side(Enum):
BUY = "BUY"
SELL = "SELL"
class UrgencyClass(Enum):
"""The caller's declaration of *why* — the only "why" this layer ever learns (§6).
Ordered most-urgent → least. The ordinal is meaningful: dispatch priority and the
"never delay a more-urgent order" invariant read it (spec §9 priority ladder).
"""
CATASTROPHIC = 0 # SL / kill / liquidation — taker MARKET now, no cleverness ever
PROTECT = 1 # TP_FLOOR give-back, ADVSL retract — maker@touch, 1 reprice, then cross
HARVEST = 2 # FIXED_TP — maker at target ± offset, chase ≤N, give up on regression
ROTATE = 3 # MAX_HOLD / admin — patient maker, TTL from deadline_ms, cross at TTL
ACQUIRE = 4 # ENTER — patient maker inside spread, abandon (never chase)
@property
def is_exit(self) -> bool:
"""Exit-side urgencies decrease a position; entries (ACQUIRE) increase it.
Exits may only ever tighten toward urgency, never reprice away (spec §4-2).
"""
return self in (UrgencyClass.CATASTROPHIC, UrgencyClass.PROTECT,
UrgencyClass.HARVEST, UrgencyClass.ROTATE)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ProtectiveSpec:
"""Attach-a-dead-man's-stop geometry (spec §10). Mark-based, rides the entry order.
Either an explicit ``stop_price`` OR a ``stop_mult`` multiple of the caller's
software SL distance — never both, never neither. The venue-attached STOP_MARKET
fires only when the client is dead or blind (HZ silent-death lineage): parity-
invisible, because it only acts once the software layer has already failed.
"""
stop_price: Decimal | None = None
stop_mult: Decimal | None = None # × software-SL distance (e.g. 2.0)
working_type: str = "MARK_PRICE" # venue geometry truth = mark, never last
reduce_only: bool = True
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
has_px = self.stop_price is not None
has_mult = self.stop_mult is not None
if has_px == has_mult:
raise ValueError("ProtectiveSpec needs exactly one of stop_price / stop_mult")
if has_px and self.stop_price <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"stop_price must be positive, got {self.stop_price}")
if has_mult and self.stop_mult <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"stop_mult must be positive, got {self.stop_mult}")
if self.working_type != "MARK_PRICE":
# Geometry truth is the mark (spec §9 three-price-truths). Guardrail, not law.
raise ValueError("protective working_type must be MARK_PRICE")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ExecutionAdvice:
"""MALKHUT/other advisor hints — an advisor, never an authority (spec §5, §11-L11).
The layer may take these hints or ignore them; CATASTROPHIC ignores them *by law*.
Advice can never change WHAT was asked (side/size/asset/reduce_only are sacred).
"""
source: str = "unknown" # who advised (provenance, non-authoritative)
prefer_post_only: bool | None = None # hint: rest as maker if possible
qty_fraction: Decimal | None = None # hint: work this fraction per slice (slicer above)
note: str = ""
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if self.qty_fraction is not None and not (Decimal(0) < self.qty_fraction <= Decimal(1)):
raise ValueError(f"qty_fraction must be in (0,1], got {self.qty_fraction}")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ExecutionRequest:
"""The whole surface. Nothing else may leak in (spec §2.1).
``guideline_price`` is a decision-time *reference*, NOT a limit — it resolves the
ADVSL stale-price concern: scan-clock exits pass the price that triggered them; the
drive loop executes against the live book, never against this frozen number.
"""
request_id: str # caller-minted; idempotency key end-to-end
asset: str # canonical undashed ("BTCUSDT"); dialect dashes it
side: Side
size: Decimal # base quantity; sizing is the caller's solved problem
urgency: UrgencyClass # assigned by CALLER, NEVER inferred here
reduce_only: bool = False # position-decreasing intent (exits set True)
guideline_price: Decimal | None = None # reference, not a limit
protective: ProtectiveSpec | None = None
advice: ExecutionAdvice | None = None
deadline_ms: int | None = None # caller's patience budget (ROTATE/ACQUIRE)
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if not self.request_id:
raise ValueError("request_id is mandatory (idempotency key)")
if self.asset != self.asset.upper() or "-" in self.asset:
raise ValueError(f"asset must be canonical undashed upper, got {self.asset!r}")
if self.size <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"size must be positive, got {self.size}")
if self.guideline_price is not None and self.guideline_price <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"guideline_price must be positive, got {self.guideline_price}")
if self.deadline_ms is not None and self.deadline_ms <= 0:
raise ValueError(f"deadline_ms must be positive, got {self.deadline_ms}")
# Contract invariant: an entry (increases position) can't be reduce_only.
if self.reduce_only and self.urgency is UrgencyClass.ACQUIRE:
raise ValueError("ACQUIRE (entry) cannot be reduce_only")
@property
def client_order_id_seed(self) -> str:
"""Deterministic seed for the venue clientOrderId (promise #4: never lose an order).
Prefix discipline lives in the dialect layer (u-/m-); this is the stable core.
"""
return self.request_id

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prod/exec_unified/router.py Normal file
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"""The whether-maker policy machine (spec §6 urgency ladder).
Adjudication verdict (spec §17-A1, ratified here in code): the Router and SmartPlacer
are **complementary, not competitors**. The Router decides *whether* to rest as maker
and how hard to work the order (reprice budget, TTL discipline, give-up rule). The
SmartPlacer decides *where in the book* the maker quote sits — it plugs into the
``pre_submit`` seam (``wants_placement`` below) and is free to return a replacement
plan. Neither subsumes the other; this module is the Router half and knows nothing
about order books, offsets, or venues.
PURE: no I/O, no clock, no venue, no ambient state. ``decide()`` is a total function of
the request alone. Everything time/price-dependent is expressed as a *rule the drive
loop enforces* (§7), not as a value read here — that is what keeps this layer
parity-invisible and venue-side-portable (C1).
Provenance: prod/docs/SPEC_UNIFIED_EXEC_LAYER_20260714.md §4, §6, §17-A1.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from decimal import Decimal
from enum import Enum
from . import _constants as K
from .contract import ExecutionRequest, UrgencyClass
class ExecutionMethod(Enum):
MAKER = "MAKER" # rest post-only (GTX); the only certified fill-improvement path (§4-16)
TAKER = "TAKER" # cross the spread now (MARKET / marketable)
class TtlDiscipline(Enum):
IMMEDIATE = "immediate" # act now, no resting (CATASTROPHIC)
BOUNDED_MS = "bounded_ms" # rest up to a fixed wall-clock bound, then cross (PROTECT)
DEADLINE = "deadline" # rest until caller's deadline_ms, then cross (ROTATE)
UNBOUNDED = "unbounded" # rest patiently; do NOT cross on expiry (ACQUIRE abandons)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RoutingDecision:
"""What the Router decided — the plan the drive loop executes (§7).
Carries *rules*, not live values: ``max_ms`` is a bound the loop measures against
its injected clock; the Router itself never reads a clock.
"""
method: ExecutionMethod
max_reprices: int # chase budget; 0 = place-once (no chase)
ttl: TtlDiscipline
cross_on_expiry: bool # on TTL/reprice exhaustion: cross (True) or abandon (False)
wants_placement: bool # invite SmartPlacer to set the offset (pre_submit seam)
ignore_advice: bool # advice is inadmissible (CATASTROPHIC only, by law)
max_ms: int | None = None # wall-clock bound for BOUNDED_MS; else None
giveup_regression_frac: Decimal | None = None # HARVEST: cross if regression eats this of unrealized
rationale: str = ""
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if self.max_reprices < 0:
raise ValueError("max_reprices cannot be negative")
if (self.ttl is TtlDiscipline.BOUNDED_MS) != (self.max_ms is not None):
raise ValueError("max_ms must be set iff ttl is BOUNDED_MS")
def decide(request: ExecutionRequest) -> RoutingDecision:
"""Map urgency → routing policy. Total, pure, deterministic (spec §6).
The five promises this enforces (spec §2.3): CATASTROPHIC is never delayed; WHAT is
never changed (this function reads urgency, never mutates side/size/asset); advice is
ignored for CATASTROPHIC by law.
"""
u = request.urgency
if u is UrgencyClass.CATASTROPHIC:
# Taker MARKET immediately. No cleverness. Ever. Advice ignored by law (§6).
return RoutingDecision(
method=ExecutionMethod.TAKER,
max_reprices=0,
ttl=TtlDiscipline.IMMEDIATE,
cross_on_expiry=True,
wants_placement=False,
ignore_advice=True,
rationale="CATASTROPHIC: cross now, no resting, advice inadmissible",
)
if u is UrgencyClass.PROTECT:
# Maker at touch, one reprice, ≤2 s total, then cross (§6).
return RoutingDecision(
method=ExecutionMethod.MAKER,
max_reprices=K.PROTECT_REPRICE_LIMIT,
ttl=TtlDiscipline.BOUNDED_MS,
max_ms=K.PROTECT_MAX_MS,
cross_on_expiry=True,
wants_placement=False, # at touch, not an offset model
ignore_advice=False,
rationale="PROTECT: maker@touch, 1 reprice, cross at 2s",
)
if u is UrgencyClass.HARVEST:
# Maker at target ± SmartPlacer offset; chase ≤ N; give up on regression → cross (§6).
return RoutingDecision(
method=ExecutionMethod.MAKER,
max_reprices=K.HARVEST_MAX_CHASES,
ttl=TtlDiscipline.UNBOUNDED, # bounded by chases + regression, not wall-clock
cross_on_expiry=True, # give-up crosses (harvest still wants the fill)
wants_placement=True,
ignore_advice=False,
giveup_regression_frac=K.HARVEST_GIVEUP_REGRESSION_FRAC,
rationale="HARVEST: maker@target±offset, chase<=N, cross on regression give-up",
)
if u is UrgencyClass.ROTATE:
# Patient maker; TTL from caller's deadline_ms; cross at TTL (§6).
return RoutingDecision(
method=ExecutionMethod.MAKER,
max_reprices=K.HARVEST_MAX_CHASES, # patient chasing within the deadline
ttl=TtlDiscipline.DEADLINE,
cross_on_expiry=True,
wants_placement=True,
ignore_advice=False,
rationale="ROTATE: patient maker, cross at caller deadline",
)
if u is UrgencyClass.ACQUIRE:
# Patient maker inside spread; abandon, never chase (§4-1: a missed entry is free).
return RoutingDecision(
method=ExecutionMethod.MAKER,
max_reprices=K.ACQUIRE_MAX_CHASES, # == 0: no chase
ttl=TtlDiscipline.UNBOUNDED,
cross_on_expiry=False, # ABANDON on expiry — do NOT cross
wants_placement=True,
ignore_advice=False,
rationale="ACQUIRE: patient maker inside spread, abandon (never chase, never cross)",
)
raise ValueError(f"unhandled urgency {u!r}") # unreachable given the enum is closed

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"""Behaviour + mutation-litmus tests for the Unified Execution Layer core.
Testing doctrine (prod/docs/TESTING_DOCTRINE.md): these assert the VALUE/SHAPE/INVARIANT,
not "it ran". Each router test is written so that breaking the implementation goes RED —
the mutation litmus is spelled out per test. Run:
/home/dolphin/siloqy_env/bin/python3 -m pytest prod/exec_unified/test_exec_unified.py -q
Mutation examples that MUST turn something red:
* CATASTROPHIC method MAKER→... -> test_catastrophic_crosses_now
* ACQUIRE cross_on_expiry False→True -> test_acquire_abandons_never_crosses
* PROTECT max_reprices 1→2 -> test_protect_one_reprice_then_cross
* drop a urgency branch in decide() -> test_decide_total_over_all_urgencies
* ignore_advice True on a non-CATASTROPHIC -> test_only_catastrophic_ignores_advice
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from decimal import Decimal
import pytest
from prod.exec_unified import (
ExecutionAdvice,
ExecutionMethod,
ExecutionRequest,
ProtectiveSpec,
RoutingDecision,
Side,
TtlDiscipline,
UrgencyClass,
decide,
)
from prod.exec_unified import _constants as K
def _req(urgency: UrgencyClass, **kw) -> ExecutionRequest:
base = dict(
request_id="r-1",
asset="BTCUSDT",
side=Side.BUY,
size=Decimal("0.001"),
urgency=urgency,
)
# ACQUIRE is the only non-reduce_only default that matters; keep entries clean.
if urgency is not UrgencyClass.ACQUIRE:
base["reduce_only"] = True
base.update(kw)
return ExecutionRequest(**base)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------- router: the ladder
def test_catastrophic_crosses_now():
d = decide(_req(UrgencyClass.CATASTROPHIC))
assert d.method is ExecutionMethod.TAKER # never maker — this is the SL/kill path
assert d.max_reprices == 0 # no chase, no resting
assert d.ttl is TtlDiscipline.IMMEDIATE
assert d.ignore_advice is True # advice inadmissible by law
assert d.wants_placement is False # no book games on a catastrophe
def test_protect_one_reprice_then_cross():
d = decide(_req(UrgencyClass.PROTECT))
assert d.method is ExecutionMethod.MAKER
assert d.max_reprices == 1 # EXACTLY one (spec §6)
assert d.ttl is TtlDiscipline.BOUNDED_MS
assert d.max_ms == K.PROTECT_MAX_MS == 2_000 # ≤2 s total
assert d.cross_on_expiry is True # then cross — a protect must complete
def test_harvest_chases_then_gives_up_by_crossing():
d = decide(_req(UrgencyClass.HARVEST))
assert d.method is ExecutionMethod.MAKER
assert d.max_reprices == K.HARVEST_MAX_CHASES
assert d.wants_placement is True # SmartPlacer sets the target±offset
assert d.giveup_regression_frac == K.HARVEST_GIVEUP_REGRESSION_FRAC
assert d.cross_on_expiry is True # give-up still wants the harvest
def test_rotate_uses_caller_deadline():
d = decide(_req(UrgencyClass.ROTATE, deadline_ms=60_000))
assert d.method is ExecutionMethod.MAKER
assert d.ttl is TtlDiscipline.DEADLINE
assert d.cross_on_expiry is True
def test_acquire_abandons_never_crosses():
# THE distinctive invariant: a missed entry is free, a chased/crossed entry is not (§4-1).
d = decide(_req(UrgencyClass.ACQUIRE))
assert d.method is ExecutionMethod.MAKER
assert d.max_reprices == 0 # never chase
assert d.cross_on_expiry is False # never cross — abandon
assert d.ttl is TtlDiscipline.UNBOUNDED
def test_only_catastrophic_ignores_advice():
for u in UrgencyClass:
d = decide(_req(u, deadline_ms=1000))
assert d.ignore_advice is (u is UrgencyClass.CATASTROPHIC), u
def test_decide_total_over_all_urgencies():
# No urgency may fall through unhandled (drop a branch -> this goes red).
for u in UrgencyClass:
d = decide(_req(u, deadline_ms=1000))
assert isinstance(d, RoutingDecision)
assert d.rationale # every path explains itself
def test_decide_is_pure_and_deterministic():
r = _req(UrgencyClass.HARVEST)
a, b = decide(r), decide(r)
assert a == b # same input -> same decision
# WHAT is never changed: decide reads urgency, never mutates the request (frozen).
assert r.side is Side.BUY and r.size == Decimal("0.001") and r.asset == "BTCUSDT"
def test_maker_urgencies_never_taker():
for u in (UrgencyClass.PROTECT, UrgencyClass.HARVEST,
UrgencyClass.ROTATE, UrgencyClass.ACQUIRE):
assert decide(_req(u, deadline_ms=1000)).method is ExecutionMethod.MAKER, u
# ------------------------------------------------------- RoutingDecision self-guard
def test_bounded_ms_requires_max_ms():
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
RoutingDecision(
method=ExecutionMethod.MAKER, max_reprices=1,
ttl=TtlDiscipline.BOUNDED_MS, cross_on_expiry=True,
wants_placement=False, ignore_advice=False, max_ms=None, # contradiction
)
def test_non_bounded_rejects_max_ms():
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
RoutingDecision(
method=ExecutionMethod.MAKER, max_reprices=1,
ttl=TtlDiscipline.UNBOUNDED, cross_on_expiry=False,
wants_placement=True, ignore_advice=False, max_ms=1000, # contradiction
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------- contract validation
def test_urgency_exit_classification():
assert UrgencyClass.ACQUIRE.is_exit is False # entry
for u in (UrgencyClass.CATASTROPHIC, UrgencyClass.PROTECT,
UrgencyClass.HARVEST, UrgencyClass.ROTATE):
assert u.is_exit is True
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad", [
dict(request_id=""), # missing idempotency key
dict(asset="BTC-USDT"), # dashed (dialect's job, not caller's)
dict(asset="btcusdt"), # lowercase
dict(size=Decimal("0")), # non-positive size
dict(size=Decimal("-1")),
dict(guideline_price=Decimal("0")), # non-positive reference
dict(deadline_ms=0), # non-positive patience
])
def test_execution_request_rejects_bad_input(bad):
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
_req(UrgencyClass.HARVEST, **bad)
def test_acquire_cannot_be_reduce_only():
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ExecutionRequest(
request_id="r", asset="BTCUSDT", side=Side.BUY,
size=Decimal("1"), urgency=UrgencyClass.ACQUIRE, reduce_only=True,
)
def test_protective_spec_needs_exactly_one_anchor():
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ProtectiveSpec() # neither
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ProtectiveSpec(stop_price=Decimal("100"), stop_mult=Decimal("2")) # both
ok = ProtectiveSpec(stop_mult=Decimal("2"))
assert ok.working_type == "MARK_PRICE" and ok.reduce_only is True
def test_protective_spec_rejects_non_mark_working_type():
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ProtectiveSpec(stop_mult=Decimal("2"), working_type="LAST_PRICE")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("frac", [Decimal("0"), Decimal("-0.1"), Decimal("1.5")])
def test_advice_qty_fraction_bounds(frac):
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
ExecutionAdvice(qty_fraction=frac)
def test_advice_is_ignorable_metadata_only():
# Advice cannot change WHAT: it carries no side/size/asset. Structural proof.
adv = ExecutionAdvice(source="MALKHUT", prefer_post_only=True, note="rest deeper")
fields = adv.__dataclass_fields__
for forbidden in ("side", "size", "asset", "reduce_only"):
assert forbidden not in fields